Midfield

Introduction.

This is the first installment of a two-part deep dive into the Essendon midfield, the engine room of the game. In this part, I’ll take a close look at the broader ideology behind the team’s approach, the methods they use and how these are implemented through their system and structure.

The second part will shift the focus to individual performances within these roles, breaking down the contributions of each player and how they adapt to and execute the strategies on field.

The midfield is the engine room of the game, where everything begins on field. This group of players drives the team forward, from centre bounce and stoppages to ball movement and restricting the opposition’s transition. As the most crucial unit among the 23, their performance is pivotal to the team's success.

Part one.

The Game Plan.

Thankfully, early in the preseason, we saw a noticeable shift in the team's on-field ideology for 2024. The emphasis moved away from defending deep in the back half and so far from their own goal. Instead, the priority now on defending much closer to goal.

This shift is supported by a strategy aimed at “making the ground smaller,” achieved by pushing the defensive line higher up the ground. By doing so, the middle of the ground becomes more congested and difficult for the opposition to gain clean possession and penetrate the defensive wall.

Building Structure.

The key to implementing this structure is securing initial territory, which enables defenders to press higher. This can only be achieved by winning ground-level contests at stoppages and then consistently winning contests ahead of the field. This allowing the defensive setup behind the ball to prevent the opposition from easily transitioning the other way.

Questions and challenges.

The main questions with this approach were whether Essendon can win contests consistently enough, especially at stoppages, given that this has historically not been a strength of this list.

Could this lead to scoreboard rewards efficiently? And finally, are the individuals up to the challenge of creating the territory for the system to function effectively?

Part two.

Contest.

Whether on the ground or in the air, winning contests on a consistent week to week basis has not been a strength of Essendon's midfield in recent years. Excluding the shortened season and limited game time of 2020, Essendon has lost the overall groundball differential by a total of -14.6 since 2019. This metric is broken down into two key areas: loose ball gets and hard ball gets.

According to Champion Data, a loose ball is defined as: “A disputed ball at ground level not under direct physical pressure that results in an opportunity to record a legal disposal.” In contrast, a hard ball is: “A disputed ball at ground level under direct physical pressure or out of a ruck contest, resulting in an opportunity to effect a legal disposal.”

The key difference between the two the pressure from congestion in and around the area.

Of the total groundball differential in this period, the hardball differential accounted for a loss of -9.3. Only West Coast ranked lower than Essendon during this time. The primary reason for Essendon's struggles in this area is personnel. Without an ideal matchup against the top ranked midfielders of Liberatore, Cripps, Dangerfield, Neale, Oliver, Fyfe, Cunnington, Wines (in previous seasons), and Rowell and Tom Green (in recent times).

Struggles.

Of all midfielders who have played at least five games this season, Essendon has just two players in the top 47 for average hardball wins at ground level: Durham and Caldwell. If we expand that to include all players who have appeared in at least one game, Setterfield joins the top 50, having played four games, with first-year player Roberts following in 55th place.

Well down the list are Merrett, Duursma, Shiel, and Parish.

While Essendon's midfield consistently delivers impressive numbers in certain areas of the game, this crucial aspect—winning hardball contests—has been a consistent weakness over recent seasons. It’s a role that remains unfilled and is desperately needed for the team to be truly competitive. This missing piece has limited Essendon’s ability to challenge the competition’s premier teams week after week and their chances of success if they were to play finals.

Among this year's finalists, only Port Adelaide ranked lower than Essendon in hardball differential. Five of the eight finalists finished in positive territory for this key stat, and over the past two seasons, seven of the eight finalists have posted positive differentials.

In Essendon's losses this year, the team had a total groundball differential of -84, averaging a loss of 7.63 groundballs per game. Even in their wins, Essendon still struggled in this area, finishing with an overall groundball loss of -22, averaging a 2-per-game deficit.

Missing pieces.

Parish and Merrett have shown that their strengths lie outside the contest, where their skills and decision-making are more effective as links in the chain rather than inside heavy congestion. While I’m uncertain whether Durham, Caldwell, Hobbs, or Tsatas are the long-term solution inside, they deserve a chance to prove themselves and show if they can be the answer.

Quote taken from my preview of Essendon versus Gold Coast in Round 12

“This week marks the start of a challenging run, comprising six games against teams currently ranked within the top eight for the percentage of contested possessions versus uncontested. It begins with the Gold Coast Suns, who are positioned as the 3rd ranked team in this metric.”

The percentage of contested possessions versus uncontested highlights how much of a team's total possessions come from contests.

It illustrates a team’s tendency to kick to contests ahead of the field, limit the opposition’s unpressured ball movement with marks and creates more stoppages.

During that stretch of the season, Essendon faced Gold Coast (3rd in contested possession rate), Carlton (5th), West Coast (1st), Geelong (2nd), Collingwood (4th), and Melbourne (8th), while Essendon themselves ranked 11th.

Impact.

Over those six games, the Bombers lost the contested possession count by 18, after being +53 in the first 11 games. Notably, they won the contested count against Gold Coast by 3, and against Collingwood by 10, while breaking even with West Coast. However, the real test wasn’t just how they fared in each game, but how the entire stretch would affect their performance going forward, and so late in the season. From Round 19 onwards, Essendon lost contested possessions by 33, despite winning the count by 20 against Sydney (12th) in Round 23.

Part three.

Centre bounce.

With a central piece of the game plan based on keeping territory in the front half, winning the initial territory from centre bounce was always essential.

This season, only Fremantle and Port Adelaide had a better centre clearance differential than Essendon, but as you'll see in the numbers, it's never going to be a complete domination.

Fremantle finished the year at +2.1, while Essendon was +1.1, with seven teams between them and those breaking even.

This aspect of the game can be too unpredictable to rely on consistently, with many factors involved, particularly the umpires' bouncing the ball to restart play after goals and the quarter breaks.

Over the past seven seasons (excluding the shortened 2020 season), points from centre bounce have averaged just 10.51 per game, contributing to under 13% of total scores. For Essendon, their +1.1 clearance differential from centre bounce provided almost no scoreboard benefit, resulting in a net loss of 0.1 points overall. What it did offer, though, was the intended gain: territory.

Improvements.

Essendon ranked 7th for time in forward half differential this year, the second highest-ranked team not to make finals. Once they gained that initial territory, the challenge became converting it into scores or regaining possession when they couldn’t. Last season, Essendon ranked 16th for intercepts between the 50-metre arcs, but they improved dramatically to 3rd this year, bolstered by being 5th for forward half intercepts.

Unfortunately, the rewards on the scoreboard didn’t materialise as expected, hindered by issues with ball use, decision-making, and connection between midfield and forward 50.

Part four.

Clearance.

This part of the game highlighted the difference between Essendon's strong start to the season and the challenges faced in the second half.

By round three, the Bombers had a +24 clearance differential, achieved against two eventual finalists who would finish the season with positive clearance margins. This dominance at stoppages translated to a scoring differential of +45 points, with 33 of those points starting from stoppages around the ground.

Overall, this source accounted for over 47% of Essendon's total score. Early in the season, it appeared to be a point of difference they had in their games against the opposition.

By round eight, the Bombers had increased their total clearance differential to +40, ranking 3rd in the league, with an additional +48 points coming from this area.

Although by round 12 the stoppage clearance differential had dipped to +21, the scoring impact still held up, with Essendon maintaining a +56 point advantage from clearances.

However, this dominance in winning the ball would fade as the season progressed. Over the last 11 games, the Bombers lost the clearance battle by a total of 45, resulting in a scoring deficit of seven points from this once-dominant source.

Conversion.

Up until round 13, Essendon converted a clearance into a shot at goal 26.8% of the time, which was 5.8% better than their opponents during that period. While Essendon's conversion rate only dipped slightly in the final 10 games to 25.1%, the real concern was the opposition's improvement. They increased their clearance-to-shot conversion from 21% to 26.7%, turning their wins at stoppages into more scoring opportunities.

Part five.

Intercept.

While scoring from clearances should be a strength, the preference is, and always will be, scoring from intercepts. This aspect of the game should account for more than 60% of the team's scoring profile.

With the AFL average this season of over 66 intercepts per game—nearly double the number of stoppages—the ability to capitalise on opponents' missed targets or regain possession through a structured system is what separates the best teams from the rest.

Part A of improving this for Essendon finally began this year, with the priority being winning the ball back closer to goal, as I mentioned earlier. Now, the focus shifts to Part B—converting those opportunities—which in turn supports Part C, defending them.

More rewards.

As I mentioned earlier, 60% of a team’s score should come from intercepts. However, Essendon only reached that mark or higher in seven games in 2024, and in just nine games did they outscore the opposition from this source. The hard work in setting up behind the ball to win it back, or intercept in the immediate area with numbers and support, deserves greater rewards.

Essendon intercepted the opposition at the 4th-best rate this year, up from 15th last year, but unfortunately, they ranked just 13th in converting those intercepts into shots at goal. The AFL average for converting intercepts into shots was just over 20%, with Essendon exceeding that rate in only six games, winning four of them. On eight occasions, Essendon won the intercept strike rate differential, securing six wins and losing another by a point to Gold Coast after the siren.

Improving the success rate, in turn, helps as the chances naturally improve for defending it going the other way, with fewer opportunities to do so.

This certainly isn’t purely dependent on the midfield mix; it includes all players on the field as well as the coaches' methods, which I’ll discuss next.

Part six.

Ball Movement.

This requires a major overhaul of the entire game plan for 2025. The current strategy of advancing the ball through controlled kicks to uncontested marks needs to change. This style doesn't suit enough of the players on the field, including both the midfield group and the forward line.

So far, the focus has been on meeting the needs of the defenders. However, as you'll read in my review of the defensive lineup, this approach ultimately hasn't made a significant difference.

Last year, Essendon averaged just over 100 marks per game, the second most of all teams, with 79.3 of those being uncontested in the middle and back thirds of the ground. This year, their total marks were just under 99 per game, with 77.4 in the middle and back half of the ground. Brisbane and St. Kilda ranked above Essendon for total marks, while Western Bulldogs, Port Adelaide, and Sydney were just below.

Being ranked alongside four other finalists would typically be a positive sign, but the key difference was that those teams moved the ball forward, gaining more territory quicker than Essendon.

The need for change.

No team was more indirect towards goal than Essendon in 2024. The most direct teams were Geelong, Gold Coast, Port Adelaide, West Coast, Melbourne, Collingwood, and Brisbane. This choice of ball movement significantly contributed to Essendon being ranked 12th in converting forward 50 entries into marks, with only Sydney having a worse rate among the finalists this year.

This preference for slow, indirect possession chains allows the opposition to roll back numbers in support behind the ball, making it much more difficult to create meaningful shots at goal.

This year, Essendon averaged just over 32 points per game from chains starting behind the halfway line, ranking just below the AFL average and only above one finalist, the Western Bulldogs. This method hinders both the midfielders and the half-forwards, who in modern football, play as a second layer to the midfield mix.

Decisions, decisions.

With faster ball movement through the middle of the ground, I expect to see more space created from the ensuing chaos, giving players more opportunities to work with. The half-forwards will have the chance to become links in the chain by moving up the ground, forcing their direct matchups to decide whether to follow them or stay back as extra support behind the ball.

These split-second decisions challenge the opposition to consistently make the right choices. This will allow the main midfield mix to interact more with the half-forwards, facing towards goal together and hitting forwards with more space around them. Additionally, it will enable the midfield and half-forward mix to get to the drop of the ball from their forward teammates, once again facing towards goal. This opens up more dangerous crumbing opportunities and increases the chances of scoring through general play, rather than relying solely on set shots from marks.

For the past two seasons, I have understood the rationale behind their preferred strategy, as there has been a missing ingredient to transition to a higher-speed version due to a lack of natural leg speed across the overall list. Hopefully, with some obvious list changes in the off-season and some positional adjustments, this change can happen for 2025.

Part seven.

Wings.

I don’t classify wingers as traditional midfielders; it's a position in its own right, though they still play a significant role in the midfield dynamic. To me, it's a sacrificial role—holding width to provide an outlet for switches by foot or defensively covering the opposition's switch, while also supporting the backline both in the air and at ground level.

Last year, Durham executed this role effectively, whereas Martin tended to position himself too aggressively to be a consistent defensive aid.

In 2024, Essendon finally brought in a true winger in Duursma, but the second winger remains an open question going into the off-season and pre-season. I’ll delve more into Duursma’s influence when reviewing the midfielders, but his defensive positioning stood out, particularly his ability to help in the air, averaging nearly an intercept mark per game, along with 2.8 intercept possessions at ground level—the highest among Essendon’s midfielders. Among the many players rotated through this position, Duursma started the second-most scoring chains, only behind the first-year player Roberts.

The right combination.

As mentioned, numerous players spent time on the wing for Essendon in 2024: Cox, Kelly, Heppell, Jones, Menzie, Hind, Tsatas, Perkins, Setterfield, Martin, Durham, Roberts, and possibly others. Duursma’s absence for eight games also played a role in this rotation.

Some of these players were able to impact in different ways. Kelly started there and quickly swapped once the game was in motion to provide cover and allow Martin free rein, rather than him being locked to a forward at half back.

Hind’s pace also proved useful to link in chains going forward. However, others didn’t make as much of an impact.

Tsatas for example, often appeared indecisive, unsure whether to stay wide or contest the ball, which is his natural instinct, leaving him ineffective. Perkins struggled with similar positioning issues, and his lack of defensive awareness limited his contributions. Setterfield lacks the necessary pace to transition between attack and defence.

The most surprising experiment was Jones, while I understand the logic, I don’t think he’s the answer. His height was certainly an asset, both in attack—where he stretched his matchups inside 50—and in defence, where he could intercept mark. But the role seemed unnatural for him, especially as it didn’t appear he had trained there during the pre-season.

Too often, he positioned himself too aggressively when Essendon had possession, leaving the team exposed when the ball was turned over. His awareness and decision-making in navigating congestion around the ground also showed limitations. Cox faced similar struggles. For years, I hoped his height would help slow down opposition ball movement on the wing, but it’s becoming evident that this role may not suit him, or that he still has a long way to go, unfortunately maybe longer than the team can afford.

Part eight.

Rucking.

Team selection was my biggest concern for this role in 2024, as it’s holding back progress in several areas and having a significant impact on other aspects of the game and certain players.

It's not uncommon for teams to have three dedicated ruckmen on their lists these days, but having three who attend on average at least 52% or more of ruck contests is certainly unusual, with Port Adelaide the only other team along with Essendon.

This year, Draper only played four games as a dedicated ruckman, while playing four alongside Bryan and six together with Goldstein. Although injury hampered him again this year, averaging more than 77% time on ground and only contesting on average 52.3% of the team's ruck contests means there are massive flow-on effects.

Bryan only played one game as a dedicated ruck, in round 12 against Gold Coast. In that game, he spent 70% of time on ground and attended 68.4% of ruck contests. In Draper’s four games as a solo ruck, he attended more than 68% of the team's ruck contests in two of them. By comparison, Goldstein played as a solo ruck in six games, attending more than 68% of contests in four of them.

Overall, Draper played alongside another dedicated ruckman in 12 games, which affected the forward setup in order to accommodate him. I will discuss this in more detail in my review of the forward line and the players involved soon.

Value?

For a player who spends large amounts of time in the forward 50, Draper’s average of just 0.5 marks inside that area brings little aerial value. While he did have an impact by bringing the ball to ground, I would have the same expectations from another forward in his place.

Among the three ruckmen, Draper started the most scoring chains, averaging 2.4 per game, ahead of Goldstein with 2.1 and Bryan with 1.2. This shows Bryan still has a long way to go in connecting better with the midfield and intercepting in the air, as he didn’t record an intercept mark this season.

Do these basic numbers justify keeping Goldstein for 2025? Unfortunately, they do. Do I think he should stay on the list? No. It’s time to test the long-term potential of the two “younger”ruckmen.

Part nine.

Conclusion.

There have been significant improvements across the board—both in the coaching strategies and in the players’ teamwork and individual efforts. There’s a blueprint for success here, though it still requires a lot of fine-tuning.

The current structure and setup should have yielded greater rewards. The intent and understanding of the weekly game plan were evident, but the execution—either through decision-making or skill—was lacking in key moments on too many occasions.

A change in approach, literally and figuratively, could improve the flow-on effects of the hard work done this season, aligning it with a more modern style of football.

Unfortunately, in my view, certain individuals have taken this team as far as they can, and I don’t expect them to make the significant impact required to drive meaningful improvement. The team has shown potential, but it’s becoming clear that some players may have reached their peak. As a result, it’s crucial to evaluate whether others within the current list can step up to fill the gap and become the key to future success, or to then look outside for fresh talent to push this team to the next level.

Go Dons !