Introduction.
So, where to start with this review? There are some very impressive key performance indicators in the front third of the ground compared to other teams in the competition. However, some of these indicators are a byproduct of what happened further up the ground, resulting from poor decision-making, unreliable execution, and disappointing planning.
With this in mind, I will cover what happened both pre- and post-forward entries, examining the play closer and further from goal, identifying what needs to change, and offering insights into what improvements could look like to give a truer indication of performance.
Those inside 50 numbers.
Let’s start with one of the final links in a scoring chain. Last year, Essendon averaged 50.4 inside 50 entries, ranking 15th in the league, ahead of only Fremantle, North Melbourne, and West Coast. This year, only three teams—Western Bulldogs, Brisbane, and Gold Coast—averaged more inside 50s than Essendon. Based on that raw figure, it’s a significant improvement in creating scoring opportunities.
Over 48% of Essendon’s possession chains that began outside the forward third ended up inside the 50—the third-best rate behind the Lions and the Bulldogs.
Where it all began.
The main driver behind this improvement was where possession chains began on the ground, particularly compared to last year. In 2023, Essendon ranked 17th for starting scoring chains, with only West Coast having less opportunities to start with the ball. This year, Essendon improved to 11th, partly due to an improvement in clearances, moving from 12th to 9th in clearance differential.
The Bombers not only started more chains, but also started them in more advantageous positions. Last season, over 37% of their chains started in the defensive 50, the 3rd highest in the competition and only ahead of West Coast and North Melbourne. This year, that number dropped to just under 32%, with only Brisbane and the Western Bulldogs starting fewer chains in their back half.
Essendon’s intercept work played a key role in this shift. Last season, the Bombers ranked 16th for intercepts between the 50-metre arcs, but this year, they improved dramatically to 3rd overall, bolstered by being the 5th best team for forward-half intercepts.
All of these are impressive metrics when viewed on their own, but unfortunately, they’re boosted by what happened once the ball entered the forward 50, with inefficiency in converting those entries into maximum points, either due to inaccuracy (which I’ll cover soon) or the inability to generate a shot at goal in the first place.
Conversion: shots at goal.
The AFL average for converting a forward 50 entry into a shot at goal this season was 48.01%. Nine teams finished above the average, and only GWS made the finals with a rate below it. The Bulldogs and Lions, who averaged more inside 50s than Essendon, converted at rates of 50.64% and 49.73% respectively, ranking 4th and 8th. By comparison, Essendon’s conversion rate was 43.9%, 15th in the league, with only Gold Coast performing worse among teams with more inside 50 entries. We’ll leave it to the Suns to work out what went wrong there.
Conversion: marks.
One factor contributing to Essendon’s low conversion rate was the difficulty in finding marking targets inside 50 for set shots at goal.
Essendon averaged 13.6 shots from a mark, ranking 10th overall, with Carlton the only finalist averaging fewer (which may be quite surprising to some.)
Despite being 4th in inside 50 entries, Essendon’s mark conversion rate of just under 22% was only 12th-best in the competition.
Connecting with a teammate for a set shot at goal is one thing; having the ability to consistently win the ball at ground level if they can’t take a mark is another.
Winning the ball on the ground.
If you’re not taking a mark inside this zone, how well are you winning the ball at ground level?
St. Kilda ranked number one in winning forward 50 groundballs when they couldn’t find a marking option, recovering the ball just under 68% of the time it was on the ground—over 13% higher than the league average. In comparison, Essendon ranked 16th at 49.7%.
Once the ball went inside the forward third, it bounced back out far too often. With Essendon’s intercept game behind the ball being strong, the ball kept bouncing back and forth in the front half, boosting the raw inside 50 figures. Only Richmond and West Coast had a worse rate of forward 50 entries that didn’t convert into a goal and rebounded straight back out.
Langford for the second year in a row led Essendon in forward 50 groundball, averaging 1.82 per game, equal 17th for the year. However, this isn’t the primary job for a 192cm forward. Of the players ranked higher than him, only Bontempelli and Voss are taller, with the rest being more traditional smalls. The next best for Essendon was Gresham, averaging 1.77 per game. Overall, this is a disappointing result.
While some of the responsibility falls on the individuals, the majority lies with the coaches—first in the method going into this crucial area, and second in the selection process for players who can fill this role effectively.
The difference in shots.
There are two ways to have a shot at goal: through general play, which involves scoring while the game is in motion, such as from an advantage call after a free kick or gathering the ball off the ground and snapping at goal, or through set shots, where the game is stopped, such as after a mark or free kick.
When comparing goal-kicking accuracy from both scoring methods, Essendon sits just below the league average of 49.34%, with 48.93%, ranking 10th.
In terms of Champion Data’s expected score accuracy—a measurement that considers expected accuracy based on the location of the shot—Essendon was taking the 7th easiest shots from general play but the 5th hardest from set shots. The reasons? There are two main ones: one is the ball transitioning forward from further up the ground, and the other relates to the quality of their inside 50 entries.
If at first you don’t succeed…
When you fail to convert an inside 50 into a shot on the first attempt and set up a defensive wall to prevent the opposition from counterattacking, you end up with repeat entries into a congested area filled with players, especially from the opposition. With limited space to work in, the forwards are forced into low-percentage scoring positions to take marks—areas that, over time, are not sustainable or reliable for producing winning scores.
One way to improve these chances is to set the defensive wall slightly further from goal, aiming to “draw out” some of the opposition’s players from the congested area into a wider part of the field. However, the most significant improvement will come from earlier in the possession chain, higher up the ground.
Snail’s pace.
It’s always going to be difficult for the forwards to find space and have one-on-one contests if the ball is moving so slowly as it goes forward, especially when it starts so far from goal.
This season, Essendon had the 2nd-highest number of possessions required to transition from the defensive 50 to the forward 50—only Fremantle required more, with Geelong and Collingwood requiring the least.
The safe ball use and sideways “chip” to a teammate allows too much time for the opposition to “roll back” numbers and provide support, which in turn is having a major impact on failing to convert the initial inside 50 entry into maximum points. From there, Essendon is forced to defend the front half, and the battle to turn repeat forward entries into goals begins, with so many defenders already set up ahead.
In 2023, the Bombers ranked 12th in the league for metres gained per disposal. This year, they’ve dropped even further, ranking 18th. Simply put, Essendon needs to move the ball forward quicker, whether by foot or through run-and-carry.
There’s no better example of what this improvement can look like than the second quarter against Collingwood in round 17.
In a disastrous first quarter, particularly on the scoreboard, Essendon had 43 handballs but lost 19 metres in overall territory, allowing Collingwood’s pressure to thrive by closing down space around the ball carrier.
In the second quarter, Essendon had 49 handballs but gained 192 metres, taking on Collingwood’s pressure by moving forward instead of backward. This opened up space for the forwards to work with. Of Essendon’s 27 points in that quarter, 19 came from chains starting in the defensive half, a significant improvement from their season average of 8.1 points per quarter.
More opportunities.
A shift in how the ball is moved forward can significantly increase scoring opportunities from the defensive half.
This year Essendon averaged 32.4 points from the back half, which was just below the AFL average, ranking 12th overall. Of that, 13.39 points started in the defensive third, which is well below the AFL average and ranked 15th. Among this year’s finalists, only the Western Bulldogs averaged fewer points from the back half, with the other seven finalists ranking in the top 10.
This slow ball movement had a major impact on generating more shots from general play.
People missing out.
With the current controlled forward transition, half-forwards and small forwards are often left scavenging for crumbs from marking targets in a crowded space, with little opportunity to capitalise.
Currently, this group of players often finds themselves chasing after balls kicked over their heads, forcing them to play in straight lines rather than in a more dynamic 360° game, limiting their abilities as scoring options.
Imagine them working up the ground and being part of links in chains forward, using their leg speed to challenge and ask questions of their matchup. A key decision is whether their opponent should follow them up or hold back as defensive support. If they get this quick decision wrong, they risk watching their matchup come at them with the ball at speed or getting turned around with overlap, beaten in the race back to goal.
Punishment.
Quicker ball movement also enhances the ability to capitalise on opposition turnovers, a key trait of top-tier teams. Winning the ball back and moving it quickly while the opposition is out of position, constantly testing their defensive setup, is what sets the best teams apart.
The AFL average for points generated from turnovers this season was 47.21, with Essendon ranked 13th, averaging 45.3 points per game. Among this year’s finalists, only Port Adelaide averaged fewer than the league average.
Essendon only won the turnover points differential against one finalist, the Western Bulldogs, and broke even against GWS, while averaging a 29.28-point deficit in this metric against the other finalists. That’s almost five goals per game Essendon could add to their scoreboard with improvement in this area.
Maximising points from turnovers is crucial, but the first step is turning turnovers into shots on goal.
Essendon’s average rate of converting opposition turnovers into shots was just 17.76%, ranking 14th in the league, below the AFL average, and only ahead of Adelaide, North Melbourne, Melbourne, and West Coast.
One problem is the game plan, but another is the need for players who can punish the opposition—through smart decision-making and the skills to execute those decisions effectively.
The team sheet.
I’ve outlined some of the methods for creating more efficient scoring opportunities, but team selection by the coaches also needs to play a significant role.
I’ll provide a more in-depth analysis of the individual players who featured in the forward half in my follow-up to this review. However, as a group, the forward setup was heavily unbalanced and not suited to the modern game.
First, let’s look at the flow-on effect of selecting ruckmen.
In only 11 of 23 games, Essendon selected a single dedicated ruckman—either Goldstein, Draper, or Bryan—alongside tall forward Wright. In nine games, however, the coaches opted for two dedicated ruckmen, pairing Draper with either Goldstein or Bryan. On three occasions, they selected Draper, Goldstein, and Wright together.
These selections often resulted in a ruckman spending significant time in the forward third, and due to injury and the need to regain fitness, this was often Draper.
Draper played alongside Bryan or Goldstein in 12 games, attending just over half of Essendon’s ruck contests. Much of his 61 minutes per game was spent forward, but with his limited forward craft and finishing skills, his predictability hurt Essendon’s forward entries. He isn’t a long-term solution as a key target—he’s not even in the top 200 players for marks inside 50 per time on ground.
How long is a piece of string?
With Stringer now departed to GWS, there’s an opportunity to create a more mobile and attacking forward third. The idea of Perkins replacing Stringer isn’t a significant enough change in my view. While I see the appeal of Perkins here, I believe his true value lies further up the ground, especially if the team adopts a quicker transition style, like I hope.
Moving away from having a ruckman resting forward will allow for a more mobile setup. Wright, alongside Caddy and Langford as aerial targets, paired with three quick, groundball players, would create a more modern and dangerous forward line.
If Essendon can find a ruckman who can play 75% of the game, Wright could cover the remaining 25% in the ruck—equating to only five minutes per quarter. This new combination, coupled with a more aggressive ball movement approach, would help cover the loss of Stringer.
Over 41% of Stringer’s shots at goal this year came from general play, compared to Caddy’s 32% and Langford’s 27.1%. The hope is that with three smaller, quicker players, Essendon can replace Stringer’s output, with the added bonus of having more variety, rather than relying on one individual.
One theory behind Essendon’s slow ball movement forward this year was a lack of leg speed in the back half and midfield. However, another factor I believe could be the speed of the forward line itself when the ground opened up.
What’s happening the other way?
If the ball was moved forward quickly and didn’t find a teammate, it rebounded out too easily, often leading to scores against Essendon.
As mentioned earlier, only Richmond and West Coast were worse in having their forward entries rebounded out, and along with North Melbourne and Gold Coast, they were the only teams to concede more points from possession chains starting in their own forward 50 than Essendon.
The Bombers conceded just over 17 points on average from their forward third, with only Brisbane and Port Adelaide below the AFL average among the finalists. The gap to the top teams isn’t huge—Sydney, Geelong, Adelaide, Hawthorn, and GWS make up the top five, all conceding fewer than 13 points per game—so there’s a goal, pardon the pun, within reach here that will make a difference.
With Stringer now traded and a more balanced lineup between height and speed, the team should apply more pressure when the opposition is exiting their defensive 50. The key is accountability—quickly switching from attack to defence and finding an opponent.
Improve this, and if the ball cannot be won in the air, then ground-level support should be more reliable, not only preventing easy transitions but also generating more opportunities at goal from general play.
Hitting the scoreboard.
Essendon had 29 different goal scorers this year, the 6th most of all teams, down slightly from 30 last year and 32 in 2022.
Stringer averaged just under four shots at goal per game, the most of any Essendon player and the 10th most in the league. Langford was next, ranked 15th followed by Caddy way down in 65th.
With Stringer gone, there’s a clear void to fill, but it doesn’t need to come from just one player. Unpredictability is a valuable asset.
When relying heavily on one or two targets, the opposition can focus its defence on shutting those players down. However, when several forwards are capable of scoring, this can create mismatches with an opportunity to exploit matchups. This reduces the pressure on a single player to consistently perform, spreading the load and making the forward line harder to defend against.
These choices allow Essendon’s ball delivery to shift from merely kicking to a predictable spot in front of goal to selecting from multiple targets in various positions, making it harder for the defenders to predict where the ball will be going.
2025.
I understand it might seem repetitive to keep emphasising changes in ball movement, but this is the key to unlocking better efficiency for Essendon’s forward entries in 2025.
The hype surrounding NGA (Next Generation Academy) prospect Kako is justified, but under the current Essendon system, he won’t reach his full potential. The style of play in the Under 18s, and throughout his football development, has been vastly different from how Essendon has operated over the last two seasons.
To thrive, Kako will need space to showcase his pace and goal smarts, creating chances for himself and his teammates. This isn’t something that can happen through individual brilliance alone—his success will depend on the selection of teammates who can complement and support him.
I’m not placing the blame for Essendon’s scoring struggles solely on the players in the middle and back thirds, or the coaches. There’s a lot of work that needs to be done collectively.
As a forward group, working together and sacrificing for the benefit of their teammates will create a more effective dynamic. Improvements such as staying in constant motion and consistently presenting as a leading option are key, but so is being mindful of the leading lanes created, allowing space and opportunities for teammates. Off-the-ball blocking of close-checking opponents in other matchups also provide valuable support.
The 2025 season offers a fresh start for Essendon’s forward structure—a chance to set a new standard of teamwork and coordination. It’s time to build a cohesive unit within the forward line that works for each other to maximise success.
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