Part Three

Intro.

This review follows on from Parts One https://thebombersblog.wixsite.com/thebombersblog/post/2025-vs-2024-vs-2023 and Two https://thebombersblog.wixsite.com/thebombersblog/post/part-two, and continues the assessment of Essendon’s 2025 season by again splitting the year into two phases.

The first covers Rounds 1 to 11, a period where the side had greater stability in personnel and structure, and where their approach can be judged on something close to its intended design.

The second stretch, from Round 12 to Round 24, reflects the cumulative impact of injuries and ongoing lineup changes, which constantly forced structures to be adjusted and made continuity across the ground impossible to maintain.

This meant the processes the team was trying to establish early in the season were difficult to sustain, making performances less a reflection of the side’s capability and more a reflection of circumstance.

Possessions.

Here a team’s and a player’s ball-winning capacity is tested across every part of the ground: at the coal face of stoppages pre-clearance, and post-clearance both in defensive mode behind the ball and ahead of it in attack, with each part contested in the air and at ground level.

The value of winning these is shown most clearly in finals, when the game shifts further away from easy ball and becomes centred on contest.

Yet the ability to work into space, provide an outlet on the outside in ball movement, and punish the opposition when allowed this luxury is just as important.

• 10 games in, Essendon’s +20.6 differential in total possessions was only behind Western Bulldogs and Hawthorn. Up to that point, they’d played three of the bottom four in this category in West Coast, Richmond and Sydney.

• In the final 13 games there was a 57-possession turnaround, with Essendon’s inability to generate outside ball the biggest issue, finishing with 216 uncontested possessions, the 9th least.

• Essendon’s default control game plan from the previous two seasons was once again evident to start the year, with no team averaging more uncontested possessions than 253.1 per game.

• It wasn’t just Essendon playing this way. Their opposition did too, with only Richmond allowing a larger percentage of uncontested possessions to opponents. At that stage, five of the bottom six in this measure were West Coast, St Kilda, Melbourne, Essendon and Richmond, who’d combined for just 19 wins from 54 games. At the other end, GWS, Adelaide, Hawthorn and Fremantle forced opponents above 38% contested, and together had 26 wins from 44 games.

• In 2023, the Bombers finished the season 17th in total groundball differential, while in 2024 they finished 15th. Ten games into 2025, they had improved to 7th and only lost the head-to-head count four times: on Anzac Day, against the Dogs, and on two other occasions, still coming away with the four points while losing this stat against the Eagles and Swans.

• Up until Round 11, Sam Durham was Essendon’s highest-ranked groundball winner in the midfield, sitting 16th overall and averaging 8.2 a game, with Zach Merrett 28th at 7.5 and Jye Caldwell 37th at 7.

• In the last 13 games, Durham didn’t have enough support beside him. Caldwell averaged 9.2 groundballs from Round 12 onwards but played only five of the 13 games, while Merrett contributed 5.74 across his next 12. Darcy Parish averaged 9.66 but featured in just three matches, with the remainder made up by Andrew McGrath, who played as a mid for the last seven games and averaged the most of any Essendon midfielder from Round 19 onwards.

• Up until Round 11, Essendon had won more ground-level contested possessions (groundballs) than marks in games against Hawthorn, Adelaide and Collingwood, all teams that would make it to the second week of finals. In each case, those opponents relied more on taking marks to control the game than on winning groundball contests.

• From Round 12 onwards, every one of Essendon’s 13 opponents took more marks than groundballs, with the total difference across those games adding up to 393, an average of 30.2. In contrast, Essendon recorded 36 fewer marks than groundballs over the same period, averaging 2.76 per game.

• By Round 11, Essendon games were the most “controlled” (more marks than groundballs) of any in the league, with the largest differential between total marks and total groundballs across both teams, averaging just under 11 more than Melbourne, who ranked 17th.

• There are two aspects that make up groundball: hardball (a disputed ball won under direct physical pressure that results in an opportunity to record a legal disposal) and looseball (a disputed ball not under direct physical pressure that results in an opportunity to record a legal disposal). Up until Round 11, Essendon games featured the lowest total hardball count of any team’s matches.

• Once again it was Durham who stood up, winning more hardball than any other Bomber in the first 10 games. He ranked 32nd of all players to have played five or more games, with Caldwell next in 55th.

• In only his first 10 games of AFL football, Isaac Kako was Essendon’s number one groundball winner inside the forward 50, ranked 24th overall of players to have played five or more games at that point. Next on the Bomber list was Durham (56th), Merrett (57th) and Jade Gresham (91st).

• Contested possessions are split into two parts: pre-clearance (in the immediate area of stoppages) and post-clearance (around the ground once the ball has cleared the stoppage area). Outside of Elijah Tsatas, who had only played three of the first 10 games, Durham once again stood out for Essendon, leading all teammates in winning pre-clearance contests and ranking 30th in the competition, with Caldwell 44th and Merrett 57th.

• In the last 13 games, Essendon would only win pre-clearance contests four times. In this period, they came up against the top nine ranked teams in this metric nine times, managing wins only against Brisbane and Sydney in those matchups.

• One of the most positive signs early for Essendon was their ability to win contests post-clearance, ranked 4th after 10 games (including both aerial and ground level). Four of the top six teams in this area would go on to reach the second week of finals, and in the previous three seasons only three finalists had finished the year with a negative differential in post-clearance contests.

• Most of the time it is defenders who win the bulk of post-clearance contests, aided by system and support behind the ball (extra players dropping back as cover). But by Round 11, Nate Caddy, in only his second year of AFL football, ranked 12th of all forwards in this measure, with only Sam Darcy, Jesse Hogan, Tim Membrey and Mitch Owens averaging more than his five per game as key forwards.

• From Round 12 onwards, outside of Caddy, Peter Wright and mid-season recruit Archer May, no other Bomber forward would average more than four post-clearance contested possessions per game.

• Across the first 10 games, Archie Roberts and Andrew McGrath were Essendon’s top two defenders in post-clearance contests behind centre, ranked 7th and 12th respectively among all players. By contrast, among the key defenders the highest-ranked Bombers were Zach Reid (31st) and Ben McKay (37th), both ranked well down the list.

• In the last 13 games, Lachie Blackiston emerged as Essendon’s highest-ranked key defender post-clearance, ranked 16th and averaging 4.5 per game in his first 11 senior outings. Outside of him, it was again left to Roberts behind centre, winning 3.99 per game, only just down on his five from the opening 10 rounds.

Overview.

Finals football revolves heavily around contest, whether at a restart from stoppage or when the ball is moving in attack or defence. So to see Essendon place greater emphasis on that side of the game during the home-and-away season was a welcome change from what had been their default in previous years.

It was promising to see the Bombers compete consistently when the game was in this mode, helped largely when the majority of the list was intact.

They held their own at stoppages, ahead of the ball with even numbers, and behind it mainly at ground level, which was an upgrade on past seasons. But once the game got outside congestion and the ball was in motion, their issues in defending uncontested possession in transition resurfaced, and as injuries mounted into the second half of the year, those problems inevitably grew worse.

Pre.

Inside the zone of stoppage, much of the heavy lifting to win the ball fell to Durham, with support from Caldwell when he was available.

Outside the two, the help that had previously come from Setterfield, when he was fit enough, was missing, as he looked to be assigned a far too defensive role for mine.

It worked on numerous occasions, none better than his matchup against Matt Rowell in Round 17, keeping the ball-winner to just three pre-clearance contested possessions. But what it meant was Durham was largely required to play more minutes inside rather than out, where he can have a bigger impact on the team with his ability to hurt the opposition.

All Bomber supporters appreciate Durham’s appetite and attitude to attack both the ball and man, and it’s why he regularly ranked as Essendon’s most effective player in stripping the opposition of possession week in, week out.

But the role he was forced to play was almost “disposable” — tasked with winning dirty ball, absorbing tackles with ball in hand, and drawing one, two or three opponents before ideally feeding it out to release teammates with running power, reliable decision-making, and the foot skills to maximise what was earned.

That’s the type of player Essendon needs more of, especially in a system where numbers are pushed up to support the source.

With Setterfield’s future beyond 2025 uncertain, the potential is there for Tsatas to step into that spot. If given the choice of who I’d rather see using the ball in space 20–25 times a game between Durham and Tsatas, I’d want Durham released outside every time.

Martin is the other obvious candidate to complement that mix. He has just as much skill, arguably more, to hurt the opposition as a first receiver from the grunt work of teammates. But outside of him and Merrett, the rest either lack the finishing polish with ball in hand, or the toughness to consistently stand up against elite contested mids.

Caldwell has at times hinted he could be the missing link.

Essendon’s stoppage turnaround against Brisbane in Round 12 was built largely off his 13 contested possessions and nine clearances across the middle two quarters, but greater consistency is still required.

With the drafting of Ben Hobbs failing to provide the solution, Essendon should treat it as a priority at this year’s draft. The positive is that strong options look available, provided recruitment is paired with the right development.

Post.

While pre-clearance contests are important in initially getting the ball moving in the right direction, they only make up around a third of all contests in a game, the other two-thirds being post-clearance. This is more a confirmation of both system, in generating extra numbers once the ball is moving, and work rate, in getting from contest to contest ahead of the ball to either even numbers in attack or, ideally, outnumber the opposition in their defensive half.

As you read earlier, this aspect of footy is one of the biggest barometers of sustainable success on field, with Adelaide, Hawthorn and Geelong all finishing the regular season in the top four in this category with differentials of +5 or better.

The Crows built theirs off the back of defenders standing up against their direct matchups, the Cats through structural changes that created a spare behind the ball to win it back, and the Hawks with half-forwards working hard to support their teammates once the ball left their immediate area.

The backline.

Essendon’s defence still has a way to go before it can reliably win — or at least halve — one-on-one contests against the competition’s best forwards. That said, there was progress from 2024, particularly in groundball before Round 12, driven by Roberts, in only his second season, and McGrath, who showed a marked improvement.

I’ll go into intercept marking in more detail in later reviews, but even within 2025 there were glimpses of what Reid and McKay could offer together.

Rounds 5, 9, and 11 against Melbourne, Sydney, and Richmond (yes, lower-grade opponents this year) saw McKay and Reid combined to win 33 of their 94 possessions post-clearance, 19 of which were intercept marks — well above their 2025 season averages of 2.5 (McKay) and 2.1 (Reid) per game.

In the Round 7 and 10 losses to Collingwood and the Western Bulldogs, McKay and Reid were left to hold up as best they could under repeated pressure, with the ball coming in too easily at stages and far more support required from teammates further up the ground. Future reviews will examine the issues around defending ball movement, which placed an excessive burden on the backline, but having all three main key posts available consistently will certainly help them compete more effectively in those situations.

Over the past two years, all three of Jordan Ridley, McKay, and Reid have only played full games together in 14 matches, with two of the three lining up 28 times. By contrast, Adelaide, Geelong, and Hawthorn had their key defenders far more reliably available this year, with Mark Keane, Josh Worrell, Connor O’Sullivan, Sam De Koning, Tom Stewart, Jack Henry, Josh Battle, Tom Barrass, and James Sicily each playing at least 16 of 23 games.

It’s this stability that allows a backline to gel over the course of a season, giving players the confidence and understanding to work as a unit, knowing when to drop off a direct matchup to cover a teammate, and when to “trade up” to attack the ball carrier, which is where some of the biggest defensive benefits are created.

Up the other end of the ground, it was largely left to three players to shoulder the contest work in the front half.

Forward line.

Wright averaged 2.66 contested possessions in the air, the 6th-most of all forwards to that point, with Caddy at 2.2, ranked 15th.

I wrote earlier about Kako’s work at ground level as an impressive start to his career, but disappointing results came from the multiples in the front third. Gresham contributed just 1.1 contested possessions inside 50, ranked 95th, while Hobbs (0.8, 165th) and Perkins (0.77, 172nd) were even further down the order, despite being selected in 10 and nine games respectively to that stage. For players at their point in development, that’s simply not enough.

The same picture showed up in their pressure numbers: Hobbs averaged 0.8 tackles inside 50, Gresham 0.75, and Perkins just 0.33, rankings of 123rd, 134th, and 290th per minutes on ground across the competition.

At different stages, these three, along with others, were asked to fill one of the most important roles in the modern game: the high half-forward.

Half forwards.

From centre bounce they push up the ground, effectively becoming the “second wave” of midfielders, with responsibilities that extend to supporting stoppages both defensively, as the outer layer restricting the opposition’s ability to exit cleanly, and offensively, joining transition on the way forward.

Gresham occasionally impacted here, particularly in the second half of the season and mostly through clearance support. Hobbs, however, has proven to me this isn’t a natural strength. His balance between hunting the ball and maintaining width means he loses his matchup too easily on the outside, and he then struggles to spread once either team has won the ball. Perkins, meanwhile, continues to battle with positioning as the game “goes on around him,” too often not presenting as a viable option when teammates win the ball and therefore not connecting in the handball chain.

Collectively, the three lacked the work rate and leg speed to get from contest to contest, either to beat their opponent to the next zone or to even up numbers for fellow forwards.

It’s a role that demands urgent attention. Essendon either needs to find replacements via trade or draft, or adjust the midfield mix to free up players like Durham and Martin, who in 2025 showed the attributes to be genuine assets in that position.

Contested vs uncontested.

At its core, the modern game can be divided into two competing methods with ball in hand: chaos and control.

Chaos relies on unpredictability largely through pressure that forces the ball to be won contested at ground level more often, with the aim of keeping the game in constant motion.

Control, by contrast, emphasises composure. It comes through maintaining possession with precise ball use and uncontested marks, allowing a team to set up the field and dictate tempo to suit structure.

The success or failure of a side often comes down to which of these preferred modes they can impose on the opposition more consistently.

In the last 13 games, the opposition was largely able to dictate with the football due to ongoing disruptions in Essendon’s weekly lineup,

while the first 10, with a more settled side, once again revealed the most glaring deficiencies in Essendon’s game in recent years: the ability to defend the opposition once they gained possession.

Be hard to play against.

Once a vulnerability is exposed, the rest of the competition quickly takes note, and unless it is addressed straight away, teams will continue to test it with the aim of exploiting it.

For Essendon early in 2025, that obvious weakness came through allowing uncontested possessions, particularly via uncontested marking, which gave opponents the ability to dictate terms. This theme will be explored further in later parts in relation to ball movement and the role marks played both with and without the football.

Six games into the season, Essendon had already allowed four of their opponents more uncontested possessions than those sides averaged across the year, while all six opponents recorded more uncontested marks than their season average. This was a big reason why, by Round 11, the Bombers were the easiest team in the competition to move the ball against from defensive 50 to inside 50.

By giving opponents freedom to dictate tempo, Essendon allowed them the time to position players in their preferred structures, which in turn left the Bombers defending large portions of the ground for extended periods with little chance of genuine reward; put simply, they were far too easy to play against.

Finals football is built on contest and winning those contests, but if the game isn’t brought into this mode in the first place, the second part isn’t even possible.

Essendon’s approach to defending the field must change, with both zoning and one-on-one methods requiring immediate improvement through training and a lift in standards. The fold-back method of defending space is ineffective, with positioning the biggest issue, and players must be held accountable for repeated lapses in concentration that give opponents unpressured options, which just forces the game to shift further down the ground.

A lot was made of the 2024 high-press game plan to defend the front half, with the criticism focusing on the inability to find a marking target or score due to crowded numbers in the area, leading to repeat entries with no reward.

In my view, it remains the method Essendon should employ as its preferred defensive setup; the main issue was never the structure itself, but the inability to punish with the initial entry due to how the ball was being transitioned in the first place.

Coming up next.

Part Four: Ball movement, examining Essendon’s effectiveness with the ball, and how they defended without it.